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"For Future Roference": The Mamathoia Removal of 1958
and the Making of Apartheid
"One may make one's own history", said Marx, "but not in the cir-
curnstances of one's own choosing". The argument in this paper is
that, the production of particular versions of history may be in-
versely related to thei r makers"' choice over the circumstances in
which they are made. For example, in a situation of increasing
powerlessneas, one may be drawn to a sense of a tima when one's
power was greater. That sense may turn the past into metaphor.
That sense.is a kind of knowledge. It is not the knowledge that
lives in facts and figures, but it certainly lives with them. It
is their casing, their skin. To U S Q another metaphor, a sense of
the past is a basic perceptual operating system. This is not the
carefully considered, .philosophically integrated ideological
posi tion of the serious hi storian; nevertheless, most people have
such operating systems. History in this sense is a system of nar-
ration, a way of apprehending the world. , -
In the modern world, governments and states are closely involved
in the making and unmaking of history. They can, should they feel
that their version of the past is elemental to their staying in
power, disseminate history via education and the Media, within
administration itself, such a version can become the ba3is of
decision-making. Policy-making as an empirical process in any
"present time" is predicated upon collective thought, which in
turn grows out of putatively collective interests. Realising the
imperatives of these interests in administration involves the
creation of a coherent axplanation that comprehends*policy as the
narrative and logical outgrowth of the past.
The historical annals of chiefly or ruling groups, are ; always
powerful, especially when they are reinforced by a highly
developed bureaucracy. All levels of the South African
bureaucracy, national and local, are involved in the shaping of
history. History making is a powerful aid to the legitimising of
new orders and power blocs. As such, history becomes an ac-
tionable metaphor of power and dominance. But historical : annals
and their metaphors are not the sole preserve of ruling groups;
socialists and nationalists alike may seek, in memory and his-
tory, the language of protest, oppression and collusion.
Many of the South African state's historical annals arise from
conflicts between dcminant and .-subordinate peoples and com-
munities. At the same time, once elaborated and put into prac-
tice, the sonse of the past which these annals portray becomes a
way of explaining and even experiencing hegemonic domi nance and
Ui<? ways in wh i ch it organ i ses and di str ibutes power re 1 at ions .
Ulil;lal history htiii an Imp I I-. 1 I. m I. U.u I n I. i..n with .Tl.lmr , Ir.-:--
powerful, but no less competitive, versions. Apartheid's evolving
peli tical, social and economic philosophy and practice, is sus-
tained by a dominant history of the land ano the people on it.
This dominant history has taken others into its belly; one has to
fight within that belly to exhume the other competing histories.
In the national bureaucracy set up after 1910, the Native Affairs
Department (NAD) was an important generator of official history.
This paper examines the way the MAD came to hold and act upon,
its understanding of history, in one Northern Transvaal com-
muni ty.
In mid-January 1958, in the days before Fax had made the country
smailer and more governed (if not more governab1e}, bureaucrat ic
cable-wires between Cape Town and Pretoria were abuzz with his-
tory. The Secretary for Native Affairs, W.M. Eiselen, cabled his
Under Secretary, C.B. Young, to despatch every piece of informa-
tion the department had on the history of the Mamathola Removal:
"DRINGENO NOOOSAAKLIK DAT AL DIE LEERS OOR DIE VERSKUIW-
ING VAN STAH VANAF HAMATLOLALOKASIE [s^cj ASOOK LEERS
COR AANKOOP VAN METZ EM ENABLE EM LEER OOR MAKOBA
VERSKUIWING ONHIDDELIK PER LUGPOS AANGESTUUR WORD."(»)
The triba replied in the same medium, via their legal counsel,
H.M. Basner:
I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE BAN. TRIBE
OF MUCKLE GLEN AKA MAM TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU REGARDING
THE ORDER...SERVED UPON THEM UNDER YOUR HAND AMD SEAL
12TH DAY OF DECEMBER 1957 AND ORDERING THE TRIBE TO
REMOVE TO THE FARMS METZ AND ENABLE IN TERMS OF
SEC.5(1)(b) of N(ative) Administration) A(ct) No. 38 of
1957.(2)
1. SABE NTS 7783: 159/335, "Mamathola Verskuiwing: File of
Secretary, Kaapstad", CABLc 17.1.1958, W.M. Eiselen toC.B.
Young, Under Secretary for Native Affairs. Translation: "URGENTLY
NECESSARY THAT ALL THE FILES ON THE REMOVAL OF THE TRIBE FROM
MAMATOLALOCATION AS WELL AS FILES ON PURCHASE OF METZ AND ENABLE
AND FILE ON MAKOBA REMOVAL BE SENT IMMEDIATELY EY AIRMAIL." See
similar cable of 16.1.1958, requesting the Psports of the 1937
and 1944 Native Affairs Commissions, the Interdepartmental Com-
mittee of NAO and Forestry, 1944, and the Tomlinson Ccnmission,
1954 to be sent to the Select Committee sitting on the Removal.
See Cable 11.8.1.1958, Eiselen requested that the relevant parts
of the 5 Makoba and 8 Mamathela files be typed at once.
The Makoba Removal (near Kokstad) was considered the precedent
NAO would follow for the Mamathola Removal. (see Memo of Under
Secretary to SNA, 11.1,1958).
2. NTS 7783: 159/335, The SNA' s r.elex 16.1.135b to the Under
Secretary contained Basner's cable.
These telegrams pointed the way to confrontation. Both sides
mustered documentary sources and witnesses for a very public
court case which concentrated the official and the public mind
upon the history of the .Mamathola and the NAO's attempts to
remake it. [
On 21 January, Native Affairs Minister, H.F. Verwoerd tabled the
carefully selected documents in the House of Assembly and the
Senate.(3) The Opposition jumped at the Mamathola issue as
evidence of "... the increasing maladministration of the Govern-
ment and the consequent threat it contains... to the survival of
white civilization and leadership in South Africa."(4) This was
just the kind of evidence the Opposition United Party, the repre-
sentatives of an older style of less rigid "Native
Administration", needed for the No Confidence Debate. They at-
tacked the man and his party.
i
UP Native Senator J.M. Conradie declafed that Verwoerd and the
National Party had botched the removal. The UP, he stated, had
always approved of the removal in principal, but abhorred "...the
way 8it| is being carried out." In his own defence, Verwoerd
pointed out that he was trying to bring off a removal that the UP
and even the South African Party before it had mooted but not
carried out. The Government was trying to defuse the tension;
this was a "very ordinary removal" that Opposition press and par-
liamentarians had "whipped up... into a world affair".(s)
For Verwoerd and the NAD,
tion in the late 1950s,
than an embarrassment.. It
issues of NAD; policy in
judiciary's independence,
also threatened to unmask
umJur lyiny NAU policy.
struggling to revamp their administra-
the Mamathola removal became even more
threatened to play out controversial
a very public - and, by reason of the
legitimate - theatre. The court case
the hi storical assumptions and beliefs
Moreover, the Removal seemed, at the time, to be another case of
resistance to the extension of Bantu Authorities. The Act, passed
in 1951, "without any consultation with the African people",
sought to incorporate some traditional elements of African, tribal
and rural local government into "Native Administration". Basner
himself had defended several other communities threatened with
3. NTS 7783: 159/335, 20-21.1.1958, Senate Minute III, p.13
4. NTS 7783: 159/335, 21.1.1958, Sen. J.M. Conradie, Minutes of
Senate Sessional Committee.
5. W.G. Ballinger Collection, BC 347 Clippings,
13.6.195_7. Cape Times, "Tribe will be Forced to Move".
WGB Clippings, 1948-60: 15.6.1957, Rand Dailv Mail.
1948-60:
himself had defended several other communities threatened with
removal or unncessary cattle culling.(') As a left-wing lawyer
and former Native Senator, he was the long-time foe of Verwoerd
and the Government's policies of rural restructuring. He em-
phatically linked the Mamathoia story to the NP's increasingly
systematic dispossession of the African people.(7)
As the counterposing affidavits passed between the Union Govern-
ment and the Mamathola's counsel, some senior HAD officials in
Cape Town and Pretoria became uneasy. 8y late 1958, even the
NAO's second-in command, C.B. Young, was recommending a climb-
down. That, retorted Verwoerd, would look as if they were admit-
ting defeat. Neither he nor the MP could afford defeat or embar-
rassment at thi s stage; in the coming year, he would have to
steer his Promotion of Bantu Se1f-Government Bill through
Parliament. Verwoerd also wanted every NAD office to create a
receptive climate among black communi ties countrywi de towards the
Bill and the system it proposed. He therefore sought to rid the
NAD of the long-running Hamathola 'problem' before proceeding
with his new plans for rural South Africa.
The National Party's approach,was something of a new broom. Under
the UP, NAD officials had identified Mamathola's problems, but
never determined what to do about with them. Most of the UP Com-
mission Reports recommended reclamation and conservation as
milder remedies, but acknowledged removal to be the final
solution. The NP chose to act upon both options in turn.
Verwoerd's NAD had re-examined the accumulated official
"memories" of the Mamathola dating back almost a century. After
Union, the NAD gradual 1y assembled i ts own memory of the
country's history. If read together with the "scientific" re-
search of ethnologists and an administrative ethos at once pater-
nalistic and segregationist, the NAD's files and commission
r <:\)Ot I : , u a n i - : l . u i ; u n : ; L l L u l . n : i n o i l i i . i . i l " | i . i t . l . " l . l i . i i . i M I ' t i t i ! i " i l i L : I
6. See J. Fairbairn, "The Sekhukhuneland Terror" in Africa..South,
3,1, Oct-dec. 1958, p.16; J. Fairbairn, "Zeerust: A Profile of
Resistance", Africa South, 2,3, April -June 1958.
7. His defence harked back to the 1942 Senate election campaign,
when he won over many African chiefs and communities with his
stress on the land issue.
THE AFRICAN PEOPLE GOT MO LAND. The Chiefs have no con-
.trol whatsoever over Trust Land... Who got this land?
How is it administered? NO CHIEF, NO TRIBE, NO IN-
DIVIDUAL AFRICAN GOT THIS LAND
WGB, BC 347 C2.111.3.2.1, HMB, "To the African Electorate of the
Transvaal and OFS", Johannesburg 1942. See also NTS, 89/362 (240)
(1), 10.9.1942, "Open letter from HMB.to J.D. Rheinhallt Jones".
RJ preceded HMB as Native Senator for the two northern provinces.
time the Mamathoia issue had begun to demand a drastic solution,
the NAD had a large memory bank on which to draw. Its own needs
prompted it to dig deep into that bank.
The Mamathola land question had its origins in the nineteenth
century. Some locations had been granted by the late Republican
Government.(B) Others, including Mamathola, were recognised by
the 1907 Native Locations Commission. During their attempt to
bring order to land policy, the SAP'S Land Commissions passed
briefly over the Letaba District in which the location lay. Under
the UF, NAD officials had never determined what to do with the
Mamathola. Commission Reports on the Mamathola Location prescribe
reclamation and conservation as the milder remedies, whereas
removal is seen as the final solution.
The Beaumont Commission of 1916 did not visit the location it-
self, but the Eastern Transvaal Local Land Committee - set up to
fill in the Beaumont's inadequate reporting - did.(9) To this
Committee, the then Chief Mamathola declared:
I am a chief of the tribe of the Naren (_s'c-l
and 1ive in my location in the Beaumont Area.
We want our location increased by the addition
of the following farms [names 12 in the
Tzaneen and Duiwelskloof Districts, including
Mcnavein and Litswalo^(}°)
He was not alone. Other Chiefs remembered the days when their
8. N.J. van Warmelo, Government Ethnologist, traced the Bangreng
of ma-ithola back 7 generations. They nad migrated-from the area
known as Balaodi, near sabie, to the llolkberg above Mew Agatha
Forest, under their fourth Chief, Podilp. Mamathola acceded to
the Chiefdotn in the 1830s. She was imprisoned in Pretoria for hert
involvement in Chief Mak;<oba (Magoeba's) war against the Boers*
(1894) and released during the British occupation of Pretoria,
1502. Chief Vuma Mamathola who died in 1944 was her sen and
Malisela Letsoalo, the chief during the removal crisis, was one
of her grandsons. (Van Warmelo, "Department of Native Affairs,
Ethnological Publicaitons No.10, 1944, "The Ba Lstswalo or
Banarene", p. 7 .
U.G. 32-'IS, Minutes of Evidence of the Eastern Transvaal Natives
Land Csmmittee 1918, R.V. Selope Vheina:s Evidence, p.95.
9. U.G. 32-' 18, Mr.H.D.M. Stanford, Sub-Native Commi ssione--,
Haenertsburg's Evidence, p.88.
10. U.G. 32-'18, p.85, The farms named were:
Ehlahs 2636, Pigeon Hole 2334, Rooi bandf c-ntein 2335, Nanowciale
2333, rairview Hill 2339, Manavlim 2478, Lipwalo 2347, Vulihwa
2360, Longridge 2342, Mamathola 234t, Tubbs Hill 2344, Hurlebrook
2343.
ancestors, whose graves were the sole remain i ng si gn of thei r
past possession, had occupied the land and felt that, in c
general sense, it belonged to them. Chi eF after Eastern Transvaa \
chief came forward with similar requests for increased land.
Mamathola's immediate neighbours, to whom that location was often
to be linked in the future, sent oral and written deputations to
claim large tracts of the Letaba Oistrict.('') All echoed
Mohlaba's piea: "We are crying out for land because our locations
are small." Most added that they wished to return to the graves
of their ancestors, or to expand their official "land" to the
farms some of their people had already moved to.(i:)
In making these requests and answering the Commi ssioners' ques-
tions, the Chi efs and thei r counc i1lors were feedi ng vital infor-
mation about the history of landhoiding and land resources into
the 'Official Memory'. The Commi ssioners were not interested in
African history for its own sake. Their questions and findings
were intended to produce support for the segregation system
proposed in the provocat ive Native Affairs Admi nistration Bill
(1917). Unremarkably, their report favoured the organised racial
segregation of the countryside into discrete native and non-
native territory:
The reasons are obvious. Small black 'islands' in a white
area are a negation of the principle of the Bill, which aims
eventual 1y no less at phys ical than it does immediate 1y at
territorial separation.
To eliminate the admi nistrative and economic confus ion "black
spots" would cause, the Commi ttee sought to "... lessen the point
of contact between black and wh i te. .. wherever pcss i bIe." But the
1913 Natives Land Act and -..he Beaumont Commi ss ion had on 1 y added
to the confusion of older landholding patterns. The Committee
cou Id not solve the problem Beaumont Area 4, which inc luded the
small and isolated Lataba District. Slotting this piece into a
broader patch of native territory was tricky, as it was
"...completely surrounded by old-established European
inhabitants."('3) In practice, a new map cf rural segregation
11. U.G. 32-'18, pp. 84-6: Letter from Chiefs S. Mamabolo, Lek-
hale and Molepo; deputations from Mamietjie of Mabin's Location,
Mohlaba, Mametwa, Maake, Mamakololo, Makuba and Mafefe (each cf
their own locations.)
12. U.G. 32-M8, Evidence of Maake and Mafefe Dn chis last point.
There is no direct evidence of how the Chiefs rated their chances
of influencing the Committee. Selope Thema, Lorn in the neigh-
bouring Leshoana area, but now resident in Johannesburg, was
openly sceptical: "The evidence oc natives i.ill carry no weight
in Parliament. Parliament is a parliament or white people."
(p.95)
could not easily be drawn in Parliament. During the next twenty
years, the NAD was frequently compelled to set asid.ee recipe
book, and improvise its land policy. In the process, the NAD in-
tervened in a limited way in rural conflicts between blacks and
whites.. Only in the 1950s, under the National Party Government's
radical reorganisation of the NAD, could segregation be sys-
tematiclly applied.
NAD officials literally and figuratively shared common ground
with whites in the countryside. For the most part, they belonged
to the same community, and shred many political and cultural as-
sumptions. To some extent, their systems of historical\narration
overlapped. However, institutions are great forcing houses of
opinion, and the NAD often acted upon a view of history that
white farmers found at odds with their own.
Their own views were tied up with the region's agricultural
potential. Its "European" inhabitants feared that they too would
suffer if segregation involved the wholesale expropriation of all
the surroundi ng black locations - Many whi te farmers told the Com-
mittee that they opposed the removal of the Native Locations
dotted about their lands. These farmers relied heavily on resi-
dents of nearby locations for their labour supply. This very
pragmatic opposition to segregation did not mean that either
farmers or administrators held their labourers in high esteem.
Comparing the Transvaal's labour tenancy system unfavourably with
the Free State's wage-labour system, Stanford, the Sub-Native
Commissioner (Sub-N.C), at Haenertsburg, denounced "Our native"
as a "baboon", useless on a farm and altogether worthless, but
"all we have."
White Lowveld Farmers had few other uses for locations in their
midst. They did have real and imagined fears about location dwel-
lers that, especially in difficult economic times, became an an-
tipathy to blacks in general. As long as the balance of white
farmers were undercapitalised and-heavily reliant on black tenant
labour, they would grudgingly allow the locations to stay. These
farmers were dimly aware of social changes within the locations.
They feared an imminent explosion of African population and
stock, and held to a deeply ingrained prejudice that African
farming methods dsstroyed the region's soil and water1 supply.
They expressed broad concern about the collapse of the old
"tribal system" and chiefly rule. The NAD shared this viaw, hut
had the task of administering the problem. Stanford worried that,
without locations as anchors of social control in the rural
areas, African farm labourers might become unruly and leave their
,)r-ihr:. Ar, .i Writ i v o C o m m i p n i n m T <-m\r- t.:in 1.1 y irivnlvnil w i t h O J I I ' J J -
Licns in reserve areas, he thought he knew the area far bettor
13. U.G. 3l-"18, Majority Report of the Eastern Transvaa;
Land Committe, p.10 + 11.
8than any Parliamentarian. Thus, he dismissed the Bill's vision of
segregation as facile: "Parliament Knows nothing about our wild
natives."{' * )
Johan Dicke put local farmers' views quite plainly. Whereas Stan-
ford saw the Bill as provin* ing segregation for its own sake,
Dicke regarded it as a way of dividirg serious from idle farmers.
In his view, the Union's land legislation emanated from "...the
fact that people complained of natives hiring ground and being
allowed to buy ground among white people. That decided the
Government to set aside native areas -<here natives should be abl e
to buy ground." He advocated the institutiona1isation of black
landholding: a Native Land Settlemeit Board to control land
tenure in Native Areas. The Board wcjld dispense land to respon-
sible African farmers, and ensure t'rit they did their "duty by
the ground." Dicke voiced the opinicn common among white farmers
at the time, that the state allowed Africans to get away with
little real farming effort, whereas whites were expected to
engage in so-called "progressive farring". He concluded that less
land for the "Native" meant that "he" would become more useful to
the "white man": "I am in favour of territorial separation as tne
only means of securing a white South Africa, but only if the
Government expropri ates the w'hi te owners . " (' * )
Dicke, Allison and Stanford were less sure of what should be done
to aid African farming. The far/rers were suggesting that the
state had a duty to farming interests. They saw any aid to black
farmers as a betrayal of the prior du-y. A certain amount of envy
underlay the white farmers demands and prejudices. While admit-
ting that most of the land on which ^-ricans lived was inferior,
there were tracts of superb ranch'ig and grazir.g country which
warranted inclusion in a white area - a land "flowing with milk
and honey", said Dicke. In the region of the Klein and Groot
Letaba Rivers, the most fertile, moLitaincus ground was occupied
by native locations, which were rapidly growing too large for
their land area. Mamathola was one so:h location.
14. U.G. 32-'13, p.ea-91 , Mr. Stafford's Evidence. with a
fatalism born of much adverse experieice in the Lowveld, this of-
ficial pronounced pithily that medicine was powerless against
black water fever and malaria. Tougf-^ess and protective segrega-
tion w^re his fai1-safe: "You must r:t 1ive in the neighbourhood
of the natives and you must not get (ralaria."
15. U.G. 32-'18, p.SI-J, "If he 'the --ative. is not fit to occupy
I*. I T * irniiii'l h " ri" F i r i •*! 1 1 v h " *>h<in I il n<- - I m .-ill n w c i l tri h.iv» n n y , A
white settler must produce testimonial Lliat he is fit, that he
has capital, and that he has the necessary qualifications. So why
should a native be allowed tc have land without these
conditions?"
Over the years, the Location's worsening condition became a by-
word for erosion in the white farmers' vocabulary. The fact that
the NAD did little to stop the destruction in all locations,
added to the farmers' sense of injury. Some white farmers, unable
to make ends meet, tried to sell off their land to black location
dwellers. Throughout the 1920s, the NAD did little to alter the
location's geographical position or its inhabitants' way of life.
The Mamathola .duly took matters into their own hands. In 1929,
they entered into the first of many negotiations to acquire the
land of white farmers in the district. The lack of clarity as to
whether whites could trade 1 and wi th blacks seemed to allow both
si des more freedom to change thei r 1ot than they would have in
years to come. Yet, though the state was slow to intervene, it
soon caught up: in all cases save one, the NAD intervened to halt
the proceedings.
"'n Klompie boere. deur die kaffers en die Letaba afgesny"
In 1929, D. Dunn of the farm Lstswalo (190 morgen), on the border
of Muckle Glen or Mamathola in the Mew Agatha Forest, told the
Assistant NC, Tzaneen, that he wished, for health reasons, to
sell his farm and that Chief Mamathola was willing to buy it. The
Chief had stated that the sale would require the NAD's approval.
The asking price was L2.500. Though unsure of how to act,
Tzaneen's Assistant NC was disposed to reject this and the offer
ii( r.t.i ydforil.ri lii (n p o r t i o n u T Mvir> i m u ) . 11 i :\ i o n n u n n rih'JW Mint. M m
situation had not improved since the Eastern Transvaal Land
Committee's day. The chief, he said, was one of many chiefs
hoping to extend their lands via purchase. However, the native
and non-native lands were still so interspersed that it was very
hard to find land both adjoining the locations and,'in proposed
Native Areas. He doubted that any of the neighbouring farms,
(which the chief had qlajmed in 1918), would be available to na-
tives at a reasonable price. In any event, Strydfontein was too
far from Mamathola, fell outside the Native Area, was too small
to enhance the tribe's prospects, and too expensive (L4.J0.0 per
morgen or L1089). The Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) shared
these doubts and the proposed sale was dropped. , •
Still the Mamathola were set on buying land. The NAD was sym-
pathetic but did nothing to help. The Native Commissioner at
Tzaneen, Kilpin, reported that the "tribe" was considering impos-
ing a levy to raise money to buy further land. He clearly deemed
the purchase necessary, as "...the location itself consists of
very broken country it is only natural that the tribe should
desire to purchase land."(i8)
16. Kommisaris Tzaneen (KTZ) (Native Commissioner) Box 14,
N2/1O/3/1O: 7.1.1929, "D. Dunn to NC, Tzaneen"; 29.11.30, T. Kil-
pin, Ass.NC, Tzaneen to SNA, Pretoria; 18.12.30, SNA to Adam
Botha, Strydfontein, Letaba; 10.10.1931, T. Kilpin to SNA, Pta.
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Nothing daunted by earlier setbacks, the Chief approached Mr. F
Winn of Monavein. Mamathola offered to buy that part of the farm
containing his ancestors' graves, which, he feared, Winn might
plant over and desecrate. Winn wanted L3 for each of his 600 mor-
gen. The Chief apprised the NAD office at Tzaneen of his inten-
tions, citing as additional reasons the lack of grazing in his
location.('7) By this stage, the Official Mind was ticking over:
the Additional MC, Tzaneen, informed the Chief Native Commis-
sioner (CMC) of the situation. Considering the merits of the case
required a dip into Official Memory. At this stage, the "memory"
stored two basi c facts about the Mamathoi a: they had often tri ed
to buy land, and their location was badly eroded. But NAD policy
held that a tribe could only buy land if it could meet 50* of the
purchase price. Israel, the Additional NC had little hope of the
small community's 349 taxpayers (who had a fixed deposit of L400
in the bank) meeting this price.(18)
The fortuitous intervention of Justice 0.A. Tindall, of Pretoria,
on behalf of his old servant, Chief Mamathola's follower, sheds
light on some aspects of the case. Firstly, the Mamathola's
finances, 1 ike those of most location communi ties, were managed,
of ten haphazardly ,• by the NAD-. (In later years, the Native Trust
took -over these accounts.) Secondly, the NAD and members of the
community had differing ideas of the account's health. TindaU's
r.i'rvnnl. ( n o n.tni" 'i i v n n ) i n--. i i t.ni) l.h.-i r. t.h'i M'un.'i him 1 i h^ri 1.7 0 0 ,-\ t
the NC's office and L63 from migrants in Pretoria. Together,
these sums would meet half the purchase price: LI,800. The Assis-
tant NC, Tzaneen, grudgingly found a further L150 in the account,
but did not change his assessment of the posi ti on. Tindal 1
pointed out a third aspect of the case to the SNA "As you are
aware. Natives find it very difficult to know how to act per-
sonal.ly in matters of this kind and if they acted through a paid
agent i t would only be i ncurr i ng unnecessary expense...". In ad-
dition to their economic difficulties, rural blacks were the ob-
jects of i ncreasi ngly bureaucrati sed "Native Admini strati on" pro-
cedures . The language of administration and its powerful chain of
speakers, from NC to CNC to SNA to Minister, could only dissm-
power communities who belonged, for the most part, to an oral
chain of communications. Yet, the dealings between local and na-
tional NAO officials and the Hamathola from 1929 to 1935 suggest
that all parties were unsure of their respective legal positions.
17. KTZ Box 14: N2/1O/3/10: 21.6.1935, F. Winn, Monavein to NC,
Tzaneen; 21.6.1935, Chief Vuma Mamathola to Sub-NC, Tzaneen.
18. KTZ Box 2, N1/15/6: 12.a.1935, M. Israel, Addi NC, Tzaneen to
CNC, Pta, "Revenue Survey by A.F. Corbett, Commissioner for In-
land Revenue", notes that Mamathola's Location'had 346 taxpayers,
being the fifth highest number of taxpayers in 9 locations sur-
veyed in Letaba.
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Into this quandary rolled the Natives Trust and Land Act (1936),
which redrew the "Native Areas" of the Union and created the Na-
tive Trust to acquire and develop them. Mamathola was now in
No.29 of the Areas released for blacK occupation. In the short
term, the Act helped the SNA solve the Monavein purchase. That
farm did not fall within one of the Released Areas, outside of
which Natives could not acquire property. The SNA shelved the
issue by forwarding .the case to the Native Affairs Commission for
future reference.
The Act established new sets of relations on the land. It was
supposed to create rural space for black people in areas they had
traditionally occupied. As such, the Trust and Land Act was about
remembering a very edited "black history"; itwas also, about for-
getting black communities' versions of that history.
The Mamathola did not forget their claims in 1936. By 1940, with
further tribal funds (L1020, made up of investment and levy) and
their /epresentative, Senator J.D. Rheinallt Jones in harness,
they requested all the more urgently, to buy more land. The Addl.
NC, Tzaneeh and future CNC in the Northern Areas, M. Israel
agreed that the location was badly eroded and had little grazing
for the now 480 taxpayers,('9) In early 1939, the SNA asked the
CMC,to tell the Chief, who was still urging matters on, that his
request had failed as Honavein was no longer part of Released
Area No.29. The SNA's message seems not to have reached
Mamathola.(20 ) In 1942, Solomon Letsoalo inquired desperately
after the proposal, clearly feeling that the NAD had used the Na-
tive Trust and'Land Act to avoid giving them any more land.(2<)
If black farmers felt that the Trust had betrayed them, so too
did white farmers. This belief was born of an admixture of memory
and desire... They had a long collective memory of a right to the
land and one almost as long of what that right entitled them to
expect from the state. Their complaints recur like a • litany in
every decade. In the thirties, the helplessness they felt was
reinforced by the massive agrarian depression and the- enduring
lack of labour, technology and marketing faci 1 ities.;.' Under the
19. KTZ Box 14, N2/1O/3/1O: 12.8.1935, Asst. NC, Tzaneen to SNA,
Pta;
31.8.1935, John Allison for SNA to Hr. Justice Tindail;
24.7.1936, Tindall to SNA, Pta; 31.7.1936, SNA, Pta to Tindail;
7.8.1940, M. Israel, Addl. NC, Tzaneen, to SNA, Pta.
20. KTZ Box 6, N2/7/3: 1.2.1939, Chief W,V. Mamahola to Minister
of Native Affairs; 27.1.1939, SNA, CT to CNC, Northern Areas,
Pta.
21. Ibid, 10.2.1942, Solomon Letsoalo, for Vuma Letsoalo to Asst.
NC, Tzaneen, "We are still to-day waiting, Sir".
circumstances, they deeply resented the state's aid to bl.ack
farmers.
In the white farmers' view, the Trust was needlessly putting
money and know-how into black farming. The Trust was buying up
land for African use and was helping Africans to farm it. For
white farmers, this was tantamount to pulling the ground, and all
its symbolic attachments, from beneath their feet. From 1936 on,
the stakes in the conflict between white and black farmers were
higher. Moreover, the state was pulling some tricky stunts.
The statistics of the Trust's intervention countrywide made the
most impression on farmers. White farmers felt that blacks were
being given too much land; blacks felt they were getting too
little. The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, empowered the Trust
to augment the land available for black farmers by 6%, to t3% of
the country's land area. The Trust's entry into the market upset
Land values and farming arrangements considerably. This sudden
injection of state subsidised capital, coinciding with the end of
the depression and new developments in disease control, trans-
formed the land market and altered the prospects of individual
farmers.
This Act sharpened the conflict between white and black farmers
in Letaba. From the late thirties, white farmers organisations
challenged the Trust's policies. For instance, in 1940, when the
Trust acquired the Hamathola's neighbour, Craighead Farm (A and
B) , and proposed to buy Litswalo, the Tzaneen Farmers' Union was
furious. The Union demanded Mamathola's removal because of the
advanei ng devastation of the hillsides and, the farmers opi ned,
serious i nterference with the Letsitele River's source and
sponges. The Hamathola themselves stated (and maps confirm) that
the Letsitele rises some di stance away from the location. The
farmers' sense of the region's geography was at best vague. The
dearth of accurate maps of the area fed their suspicion that the
Letsitele and the Letaba rose in the location. Officials were not
much better off: Surveys by the NAD's Division of Native Agricul-
ture from the thirties through the fifties show that departmental
knowledge of the water resources was sketchy. Their "knowledge"
was off-set by the strong undertows of fear. They worried that if
Letswalo were given over to the Hamathola, "several highly
developed ^whi te} farms" would be cut off, presumably from other
white farmers.
Yet the white farmers were in a powerful position. The NAD in-
sisted that the farmers' approval be sought before any sale to
the Trust. As a rule, farmers opposed the sale of farms in the
district. In 1939, the Secretary of the Groot Letaba Boerevereen-
i gi ng declared hi s organisation's categorical opposi tion to the
Trust's proposed purchase of the Farm Janetsi. His reasons
epitomise this genre of objection. Janetsi was next to the Letaba
River. The Letaba's headwaters, 1i ke the ri vers in other loca-
: . - . : ... : .- 13 , . . . - - ". •
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tions, were bad! y'eroded, which depleted the water supply these
rivers might offer to white-owned farms. The erosion was the
-fault of unscrupulous "native'.' farming. The complaint would have
been incomplete without its ideological component. The Union
feared being encircled by African-occupied farms: "...ons is:, 'n
klompie boere wat deur die kaffers en die Letaba Revier 'sic af-
gesrty is en ons kan onder geen omstandighede toelaat dat ons ver-
der afgsny word nie."(*z)
During the Second World War, the NAD made little progress with
rural segregation. On the other hand, the white farmers' calls
for removal went almost unheeded; In 1949, the Letsitele Valley
Farmers' Association agreed to the Trust's proposed purchase of
Tamara (a portion of Masimu) and Sivorali, in place of Litswalo
subject to several conditions. At the same time, the farmers were
obdurate that Mamathola be removed and the land confiscated. With
it should go the Trust's portions of Craighead (A + B) and the
mountainous parts of nearby Mogoboya's Location. They insisted
these areas be given to the Forestry Department and fenced with
six-stranded barbed wire, that the Trust should erect and main-
tain. They also asked the Government to declare these spots a
Conservation Area (in terms of the 1945 Soil .. Conservation Act).
and encouraged the protection of all streams and the area's total
re-afforestation. Finally, they sought to establish themselves as
a voice to be reckoned with in local politics. The Trust, they
reiterated, must make no further purchases in the Letsitele val-
ley without obtaining their approval.(23)
Farmers memories of the state's promises to them were longer than
the Government's. Farmers remembered that Native Affairs Commis-
sioner, Heaton Nicholls, had promised them that no white com-
munities would be disturbed for the sake of "native settlement".
But they saw the Trust's continued purchase of land as evidence
of the state's bad faith. The Annual Congress of the Transvaal
Agricultural Union received many petitions from its constituent
unions, demanding that the 1936 Act be amended to forbid the sale
of any farms to the Trust except in Released Areas. The farmers
resented their reliance on the state's protection to allay their
fears of being overwhelmed: "Die Naturelle stroom nog altyd in en
22. Hoofnaturallekomisaris (HKN) (Chief Native Commissioner) Box
66: 16.1.1939, E.J. Genis, Sec. of Groot Letaba Boervereeniging
to Add. NC, Tzaneen (my trans.). The extensive correspondence
concerns the farms Oochhoek No.241, Radoo No.240, Womgololo
No.244 and Mirangoma (no number given). The interaction between
farmers and state gives important insights into principles in-
forming the NAO's decisions on Letswalo and Monavein, as well as
the farmers' antipathy towards African farmers and the Trust.
23. HKN Box 66: 7.1.1949, F.C. Ferguson, Chairman of Letsitele
Valley Farmers' Association to SNA, Pta.
die moeilikheid neem toe".{*4) - .
_ . .—.. . '"Die Vretende Kanker"
In 1950 white farmers of two Northern districts publicly accused
NAD authorities of betrayal. In that "gesonde dorp", Pietersburg,
a delegation of farmers, the Chamber of Commerce, the Town Coun-
cil and the local HNP, condemned the amount of land alienated to
the Trust.(!S) In a meeting with the Minister of Native Affairs,
Dr. Janssens, Pietersburg's HP, Tom Naude (then Speaker of the
House) and MAD's Secretary, W.M. Eiselen, the delegation warned
that indiscriminate alienation of land to the African population
might wreck Pietersburg and the North's promised prosperity. In-
creasing the number of black farmers, who had little value for
land and farming anyway, would destroy that land, and, with it,
investor confidence in the district.
More significant than the accuracy of these claims and promises,
was the moment at which they were spoken. The sound and fury of
this "moral" panic suggest that, far from struggling, the
region's farmers anticipated an agricultural boom after the War
and. .resented ,_the state's- apparent disinterest- in- their
progress. (*8 ) For, though the state's Agricultural technici ans
24. HKN Box 3: (25JN2/1O/4: 2 7.6.1947, Zoutpansberg Review.
"Munnik Farmers up in arms against Trust buying".
HKN Box 3: (25)N2/10/4, 19.9.1950, Noord-Transvaler. "Boere-Unie,
Stadsrad en Kamer van Koophandel Opponeer verkope aan Trust:
Pietersburg se Toekoms op spel"; 28.3.1950, Noord-Transvaler.
"Afvaardiging ontmoet Ministers Teen Verder aankope van grond vir
Trust"
25. HKN Box t, 1/0/2, Deel II: See Table "Lands Purchased: Posi-
tion as at 30 April 1940 Transvaal Province". The Trust had
bought approximately 214,970 morgen for L511,360.13.10 around
Pietersburg, at a lowish average price per morgen of LI.13.0. The
Trust was committed to buying 4,980 morgen more for L14,015.0.0.
Pietersburg purchases made up almost a quarter of all Transvaal
purchases, for which L2,264,647 had been paid for 966,181 morgen
by .the same date. Pietersburg Farmers accused the Trust of having
bought 79,000 morgen in excess of their J936 estimates in the
district. Farmers claimed they had initially sanctioned this ex-
tra purchase because of the previous NAC's promises "...that as
long as the sun rose in the east and set in the west, their
Pietersburg would not be asked for more ground."
26. HKN Box 3 . (25)N2/i0/4; 28.3.1950 Noord Transvaler.
"Afvaardiging Se Vertoe Aan Ministers Teen verder Aankope Van
Grond Vir Trust".
See also KTZ Box 6: File N2/7/3, "Farms: Haffenden Heights, and
Others, Pietersburg District", 21.10.1944, J.A. Hood, Hon. Sec.
of Ofcolaco Farmers Association to Ass.NC, Lsydsdorp. This
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had much to offer i n the way of malaria and black water, fever
controls, scientifie farming and state-aided finance, they also
were extending these to black farmers in locations and on tribal
and Trust farms.. .White farmers had, historically, considered
these people a "natural" source of labour, whose cheapness would
offset the high costs .of farming.
In addition, Pietersburg's local economy had new infrastructural
strengths: South African Railways' investment of L250.000 in the
region made Pi.eter.sburg the easily accessible pivot of agricul-
tural renewal. This economic potential nourished local commerce
and industry, whose representatives joined the farmers' protest,
(27)
In 1950, a second group of white Northern Transvaal farmers
lodged their formal protest about the Trust's land policy with
the Nati ve Affai rs Commi ssion. They feared - wi th reason, i f one
reads Dr. Verwoerd's expropriation plans - that the whole area
would be made into a black reserve. They poured scorn on state
aid to black farmers, in particular the Letaba Qantu Farmers' Co-
operative (LBFC), who were, they alleged, open 1y competi ng on the
"white" markets.
The State and the Letaba Bantu Farmers' Co-operative
The Letaba Bantu Farmers' Co-operative (LBFC) was an historic; it
was the most successful organisation of its kind in the Northern
Areas. That is, if success be measured in terms of output. There
were other kinds of success: the organisation certainly raised
black farmers self-esteem. From the NAD's point of "view, the LBFC
was based on more progressive farming methods, and as such, could
shift the authority structure of location society. Some black
farmers found, . through the LBFC a means of accumu lat i.ng in-
dividual savings, and by-passing the authority of the chief. .
To understand the politics surrounding the LBFC's formation, one
needs to tell its story "backwards". The "Co-operative" was the
MAD's most promising and dangerous brainchild in Letaba. It was
dangerous because white farmers saw it as the final straw.' •
The Letsitele and Letaba farmers unions, like the Pietersburg
farmers, resented the combined adversity of high production
costs, crippling mortgages, and the complexity of fruit farming.
Moreover, the expense of its distribution was hardly offset by
protest did not stop the Trust buying the Haffenden group of
farms or attempting to re-settle the Mamathola there. Metz, the
eventual re-settlement site, is also near Leydsdorp and Ofcolaco.
27. HKN Box 3 (25)N2/1O/4: 28.3.1950 Noord Transvaler.
"Afvaardiging Se Vertoe Aan Ministers Teen verder Aankope Van
Grond Vi r Trust".
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its low prices. - Its need for irrigation schemes, containing
canals and spraying systems, required major capital outlay. In
the farmers' view, the state was doing little to stop the real
and threatened destruction of natural water sources (rivers,
streams and water sponges) that was at its worst in "native
areas". Worst of all, the state, was pursuing the contradictory
policy of luring away their labourers and setting them up in com-
petition. Even after 1948's change of government, the state
remained aloof from these grievances. When black farmers tried to
market similar crops - maize, fruit, vegetables - white farmers
became openly hostile. They won the support of those NAD offi-
cials who had always doubted the wisdom of co-operative farming
for blacks.(ZB). These objections were not at first heeded. The
LBFC's growing strength in the early 1950s signalled to white
farmers that apartheid, which had promised deliveranee from such
problems, was serving the state rather than its electorate.
Letaba farmers rejected the Trust as little more than "large-
scale farming by the State itself... we small farmers have no
hope of withstanding such a strong power."
The LBFC's apparent boom in the fifties was the result of a
change in. NAD policy in the mid-forties. The balance of NAD's
amibiguous stance towards "raw unschooled natives", swung, for a
while, in the latters1 favour. Mamathola, one of the areas the
whi te Letaba farmers most despi sed, became part of thi s changi ng
initiative.
Having a memory .of the location's eroded state, did not prompt
the HAD to. conserve land and water in Mamathola. Department Cir-
culars for the early 1930s show that MAD undertook no irrigation
works or fenci ng during the per i od. The NAD Agricultural
Section's reclamation survey of 1 938 confi rmed Hamathola's d i re
position and was the "scientific" basis of the "official momory".
Surveyor J.M. Holm identified existing patterns of land use and
calculated, for the future, how to apportion the land for special
purposes. They measured the crucial ratios of human and animal
populations to land area, present and potential water supplies,
dipping tanks, fences and forestry lots. The report found all the
"Native reserves" in Letaba, but especially Mamathola's Location,
"overcrowded" and overstocked.
The location's size and hillside position had made it vulnerable
from the start. It was much the smallest of the district's sig-
nificant "North Sotho" (NAD term, 1950) locations.(29) Neighbour-
28. KTZ 2: File N1/15/6, "Office and District Administration",
"Annual Reports of Ad.NC Tzaneen, 1947-8 and 1949".
29. KTZ Box 1: File N1/12/6, "Ethnology and Custom: History",
19.12.1950 "W.J. Pretorius, Ad.NC, T'aneen to CMC, Pietersburg".
The department required Pretorius to fill in the National
Register (Ethnicity Table) for his region as follows: Tsonga:
' • -
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ing Moguboya; and Maake'Locations had, respectively, more than
three and. four times its land area. Moguboya had 3853 residents,
Maake 3313 and Mamathola 1-164. While Moguboya had 2.69 morgen per
head and Maake 3.55, Mamathola had only 1.85. Total population
outnumbered large stock by more than two to one, while , Moguboya
had an . average of 1.Q7 stock per taxpayer and Mamathola 1.6.
Mamathola had more goats, but fewer draught animals than the
other two locations.(30 ) The ratio of land to population in the
location was way below the MAD's purported average of 7.9 morgen
psr person in the Transvaal.(3')
In addition, surveyor Holm took a kind of scientific offence (not
unmixed with moral outrage) at black farmers attitudes to their
land. His survey was the first to offer a "scientific" basis for
ethnic differentiation. He pronounced all black farmers "very
backward" and, "the Basutos especially very suspicious and
superstitious". Their reasons for farming, to satisfy subsistence
needs and acquire .cattle were anathema to disciples of
"progressive" farming.
The Native takes no pains to fertilise the soil by...
manuring' or rotation of crops. When their land becomes
depleted... the usual practice is to abandon such lands
and break up new ones elsewhere, burning down the trees
thereon. . .'. .. • . - . •.
The survey offered few remedies for the districts' needs, while
it found most of Letaba's 43 dipping tanks decayed and disused,
it recommended only 2 more tanks for the whole district! The sur-
vey found that poor water supplies were depleting the quality and
quantity of cattle and smaller stock. It advised the building of
Bankuna, Baloyi (Mamitwa and Makuba); Bahlabe (Bumeri); Bahlabe
(Shihoko); Rikhotso (Mamgoiolo).
North Sotho: Bakone .ba Bakgaha (Maake); Bapedi ba Thabina
(Mogoboya); Nareng ba Letsoalo (Mamathola). Van Warmelo's
analysis, heavily reliant on German and Swedish missionary
sources, described the Banareng ba Letsoalo of Mamathola as a
discrete ethnic group,, largely because they spoke a unique brand
of "Lovedu-ised Sepedi". (NAD, Ethnological Publications', No. 10,
1944, N.j. van Warmelo, "The Ba Letswalo or Banarene", p..7)
30. KTZ Box 2: File N1/15/6, "Annual Reports, 8.8.35-16.2.40",
10.11.1936 "Report on Native Affairs, 1935".
KTZ Box 6: File N2/7/5, "SA Native Trust Farm Lorraine 185,
7.7.39-14.11.41" .
31. The average is taken from the 1951 Census; the pressure on
land in Mamathola had not been relieved by then, as no further
land had been allocated to it, and the population had increased
considerably. NAD Report, 1953/4, p.11.
. . . ,g
more stock dams to stop animals trekkino vast ' distances _every
day. The survey:suggested dams for nine locations, but omitted
Mamathola, the one it had found driest and most eroded.(32) .
This survey is the companion piec<i to Van Warmelo's Ethnological
Survey of 1944.. DoLh stored, for future reference, expert
knowledge about the Mamathoia. Both were used, when Uie time
came, to "plot" a new position for the Mamathola on apartheid's
ethnically segregated map of South Africa. These kinds of studies
told Native Affairs officials what they wanted to hear. The
Government Ethnologist logged the few "historical facts" that the
government based its administrative dealings with the"tribes" on:
the Mamathola's chiefly ancestry, totems and ethnol i ngui -j Lie
proximity to other "tribes". The Department did not even consider
the kind of insights anthropology might have given tribal cattle
usage. NAD Agricultural Officers found the "nati ve" reverential
attitude to cattle absurd, magical and backward. Black farmers'
tendency to overstock, under-d i p and under-se11 confi rmed the
NAD's opinions and caused further erosion and depletion of the
stock's quality. "Only in years of scarcity , and when the Native
has to pay his taxes, is the selling of cattle resorted to",
declared Mr. Holm. If one sees the survey as an act of scientific
memory., . then the NAD's limited and scornful attitude to location
cattle-keeping is an act of semi-conscious historical forgetting.
The NAD did not forget about the Survey, they were merely slow to
act upon. it. Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the Agricul-
tural Division let black farming rely on the ki ndness or
malevolence of Nature. Reports of good crops usual 1y gave way to
reports of their destruction, by plagues of arm/ worm in one
case. The Native Trust concentrated on a few projects. Chief
Mohlaba, approved of the soil conservation work in his location.
On the other hand, Chief Moguboya had to be warned not to inter-
fere with East Coast Fever fences. Parts of Maake's Location were
also fenced. NAD constantly encouraged fertilisation to renew
the land's resources, but complained repeatedly that "native"
farmers were too conservative or had too 1i ttle transport to
deploy adequate fertilisation.^' )
After the Second World War, NAD began to realise that upgrading
the locations might stem erosion, convert some of the inhabitants
32. KTZ Box 9: File N2/11/3, "Native Settlement + Reclamation",
11.5.1938 "Preliminary Report: Location Reclamation Survey,
Letaba District". Holm found that half of the 5000 cattle (of
26,168) that died,in 1935, had perished through lack of water.
33. KTZ Box 2: File N1/15/6, "Annual Reports, 8.8.35-16.2.40",
18.11.1936 "Report on Native Affairs, 1936". File N1/15/6:
"Office and District Administration": "Annual Report 1944:
Tzaneen Area, Letaba District".
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to progressive farming methods and, thereby, improve their
prospects. This haphazard attempt to institutionalise black farm-
ing implicitly/accepted that farming and agricultural accumula-
tion were inseparable from social and poli tica1 structures. The
NAD's agricultural and civic administration expanded to incor-
porate these -structures. It is hard to pin particular policies
and attitudes to particular people, but black farmers found some
support from the Additional Native Commissioners (Ad.NC) and
Agricultural Staff at Tzaneen and the NC at Duiwelskloof,
In late Apri1 1947, the Add.MC, Tzaneen, R.I. Gwi1t became
Honorary Chairman of the newly formed LBFC. His surprise sug-
gests that its formation somewhat exceeded NAD's expectations,
even though the NAD's Co-operative Division had been lecturing
on this subject two months earlier. Mr. Melie of the Division had
told the assembled chiefs that "the advantage of the European
over you is that they co-operate". On the other hand, L. Pienaar,
Tzaneen's Agricultural Officer, thought that his region was not
ready for such a project. The actual proposal came from two
Hamathola residents, Thomas Rakoma and John Hosana. They united
the Farmers' Associations of Mohlaba, Sekororo and Maake's Loca-
tions, and of' the Thabina, Tours and Lorraine Trust Farms and
Julesburg Tribal Farm into the LBFC.(3*)
The term "co-operative" was misleading. Technically, the LBFC was
a large Farmers' Association, as blacks were not entitled to form
co-operatives under the Co-operative Societies Act of 1939. This
Act, and the similarly exclusive Control Boards established under
the Marketing Act, gave white farmers significant advantages in
distributing their produce. The threat that the LBFC posed to
white farmers was bound up with the massive growth of Afrikaner
nationalism in the fifteen years beforo 1950. Though possessed of
many able orators, theirs was not a nationalism that "ended up in
speeches'^3s ) The Economic Movement bound Afrikaners throughout
the country together in organisations that fostered the accumula-
tion of savings: agricultural co-operatives and, behind them, the
Reddingsdaadbond. These firm institutional structures gave mem-
bers access to markets, banks, new machinery and technology; They
34. KTZ Box 1), N8/l/5(1) "Organisations, Co-operatives and Non-
Fol -; tical Societies", 23.4. 1947 : "Minutes of Meeting. . . at
Tzaneen... for formation of Native Farmers' Co-operative
Company"; 7. 2 . 1 94 7 : "L. Pienaar to Add.NC, Tzaneen, re: Co-
operative Vegetable Scheme: Letaba District and See Table collat-
ing member locations' profits and contributions, 1949-52.
18.3.1947, "Native Farmers' Co-operative Meeting: Letaba".
Ibid: 18.3.1947, "Native farmers' Co-operative Meeting: Letaba",
Mssrs. Melle + Wehimeyer of NAD Co-operative Division's Speeches.
35. See H. Bradford, A Taste of Freedom: The.ICU in Rural South
Africa. 1024-9. (Johannesburg, 1938) p.274.
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gave many white farmers a greater sense of organisational'
strength based on a new concentration of capi tal in agriculturs:
L2.2 miMion in 1936 grew to L12.2 million by 1949.
This was a crucial date for white co-operatives, for after the
War,' the Control Boards, which had initially spurred their
growth, appeared to turn against them. Ths Eoards' new purpose
was to keep prices low, and create a "cheap food" policy for
South Africa. Farmers who had seen the dawn of boom time in the
war now feared its eclipse. Lower prices encouraged undercutting,
and the LBFC seemed, to the white farmers, to be ravaging the al-
ready poor prices of fruit and vegetables on local markets.<3s )
The Mamathola had been farming "oranges, avocadoes, mangoes,
lemons, grenadillas, naartjies, and paw-paws" for some years with
NAD encouragement.(37) The Mamathola Farmers' Association, al-
ready active in 1943, was formalised in 1945. The District
Agricultural Officer became its Honorary Advisory President, anu
issued i ts members a list of strict aims and rules. These
resembled the rules of other black farmers' associations and con-
veyed the NAD Agricultural Section's purpose in fostering the or-
ganisations.
The aims were:
1. To facilitate arrangements for the purchase of members'
agricultural requirements and the sale of members' produce.
2. To establish a Savings Bank 'Accounts of the Association
and encourage thrift,
3. To encourage progressive methods in all branches of
Agricu1turs.
The fact that membership was not restricted to Mamathola resi-
dents, and was contingent on a fee (10/- to join, 5/- per annum),
created an organisation that could distance itself from
"traditional" authority. Co-operation was encouraged insofar as
it would further individual accumulation. The Association would
offer loans en the strict understanding of their swift
rppnymnnt. (3 " ) Some HAD of f ic in 1 s rJ tU not", .support the p 1 an , but
the CNC for the Northern Areas, eagerly foresaw the day when all
black rural communities would conjoin their individual farmers'
associations to one unifor.-n central body that stood for
"Progressive Agriculture", "Welfare Work", "Banking" and "General
36. D. O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme (Johannesburg, 1933), pp.185-90.
37. HM8, Solomon Letsoalo, "Naboth's Vineyard", p.2. Solomon's
son, Edward Letsoalo remembered the location's fruit as very
abundant: "Mamathola was a Second Canana". Interview with Mr. E.
Lstsoalo at Metz, near Leydsdorp, Cecember, 1987.
38. Ibid, 17.10.1945: "Mamathola Farmers' Association".
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Upliftment".(3») To fix these principles firmly in members'
minds, a large number of white NAD officials "on the executive
kept tight control over loans and accumulation.
The MAD hoped they were sponsoring an organisation that would set
farming on an economic footing and cut it loose from "backward"
tribal allegiances and beliefs. Their efforts throughout the
country received "fair support". Best supported in the Northern
Areas, the NAD noted, was the LBFC.{*°) By the time the white
farmers complained, it had 852 members farming 515 one-eighth to
one morgen plots around Tours and Thabina. Plots were farmed in-
dividually, but produce was marketed co-operatively. Revenue went
into a reserve fund. To distract attention from its large role in
the LBFC's organising, the MAD reported that it "envisaged that
the scheme-wi11 eventually be run by the plot holders them-
selves." This prediction was made on the basis of a good year.
The LBCF had 25,000 citrus and deciduous trees in production but
the bulk of their harvest was vegetables, valued at L25,000.(4' )
NAD officials may have deemed this success a break with prior
farming practices. But thair aims ran aground on another aspect
of the state's agricultural policy: the creation of separate
markets for black and white farmers and consumers. The poor dis-
tribution channels available to black farmers undercut their
successful production, Pienaar considered poor marketing the
tluwnf ill o T 1)1 ;ii:k fnr niing . W h i 1 •• 1.1m w h i ho f n n i m r n nl*.t.rn-.l'."rt t.h"
LBFC's "overproduction" of tomatoes for bei ng too profi t-
ori ented, Pienaar pai nted a different picture. He argued that the
1947 harvest produced tomatoes of excellent quality and quantity.
Yet, as farmers had no boxwocd to package them, these glutted
local markets. During the financial year, they had, at times,
sold for 3d a box, and were often less trouble simply to throw
away.
Pienaar, . whom Mamathola farmer, Josiah Makwela'once called'"the
lover of the blackmen's progress", pointed out that poor market-
ing greatly discouraged "...a farmer who has nothing to fall back
on after...all "the expense of raising the crop." Unless marketing
39. Ibid, 30.9.1947, E. Mogg, CNC to Asst. NC, Tzaneen; •;
KTZ Box 2, File Ni/15/6 "Office and District Administration",
"Annual Report of the Add.NC, Tzaneen, 1947-8". ,;
40. NAD Report, 1950-1, p.38. There were 36 farmers' associa-
tions, women's societies, advisory boards and show societies in
16 districts of Natal. In the Transkei, there were 933 such
bodies with 15,925 members. Measured in terms of savings in trust
funds, Letaba's second strongest organisation was Ramakgopa's
Location, followed by Matoks Location. The District Co-operative
in Potgietersrust failed due to lack of funds. :
41. NAD Report, 1950-1, p.38.
22 . v,
were improved, Pienaar felt it would be irresponsible to gdvise-
these farmers to plant .another • season's vegetable crop.(*z )
Clearly, this was a countrywide problem: in Trans^ei and the
Western Areas, many black farmers had reportedly losi interest in
farming because of poor marketing. ( ° ) NAD officials had few
solutions.
Despite his sympathy with the LBFC's difficulties, Pienaar had
few practical remedies. To alleviate the shortage cf transport,
he sugyested that the Trust lend the Farmers' AssDciations a
lorry. The farmers, unable to purchase their cwn transport, were
willing to hire the Trust's vehicle at about 8d per rile. He an-
ticipated that the lorry, with 4 locations, 3 Trust, farms and 400
farmers to serve, would seldom be left idle. WithoLt transport,
he predicted the Co-operative scheme's imminent demise.(**)
42. NAD Report, 1950-1, p.29 contains a report on the growth of
citrus, mango, pawpaw and banana farming.
43. NAD Report, 1950-1, p.29
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areas Agricultural Union, the SA Producers and Distributors Ltd
and the Action Commi ttee for Co-operative marketi ng registered a
lengthy complaint against the state's perceived acvancement of
black farmers.
44. Ibid: 7.2.1947, L. Pienaar, Agric.
Tzaneen.
Officer to Add.NC,
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While .they Vworked together to solva transport problems,' black
farmers-and .the Trust disagreed on the question of overstocking.
NAD advocated sales to reduce overstocking in the locations.
Agriculture Officers-held forth on the subject at the'i-Quarterly
Mn<*t. inos wi th thn Oistri^h'n CM infi. Wlmn finvnrnnioiit1. Unt.i r.n
Mo.1032; stipulating compulsory culling, was read out at a meet-
ing in August 1949, Chiefs spoke out against stock sales:
Stock is the Bank and means by whichour people acquire
wives. The wage rate on surrounding farms and sawmills
is only LI • per month and Natives are prevented from
going to Johannesburg because it is congested. Stock
sales are dominated by European speculators who only pay
L2 • per beast and' if owners refuse to sell they are
driven away with sjamboks. i-
Stock reduction was often on the agenda at the Ouarterly Meet-
ings, which were occasions on which MAO and Chiefs debated how to
run the countryside, politically and agriculturally. The tone of
the meetings was often highly didactic, with NCs and Agricultural
Officers ordering:the Chiefs to carry out the NAD's plans. Im-
plicitly, the NAD was superimposing their beliefs about land,
labour and resources upon the older chiefly beliefs. Every dis-
cussion was a challenge to chiefly power.(4S)
E.V. Liefeldt, the NC at Duiwelskloof, understood to some extent
that implementing up to date farming methods meant modernising
chiefly rule. He tried to lessen the blow by saying that the man-
ner of stock reduction would be left up to Chiefs and their com-
munities. Appealing to "progressive elements", he added that
spending money on stock in overgrazed and eroded areas was a very
bad investment and that the "tribes" should mod.ify their lobola
customs "to an economic basis as distinct from a numerical basis
to avoid . irreparable loss and damage to individual stock owners
and to the community", Liefeldt's crisp words exemplify the NAD
view that African culture was ultimately to blame for poor rural
conditions. Given the NAD's limited ability and inclination to
improve resources and education, that culture would'.have to
change. (*6 ) j .••
• ' i '•
These criticisms and piecemeal interventions were intended to
promote the NAD's main rural goal: intensive farming in the
reserves. Yet progress was retarded by educational and • economic
barriers to advancement, by the L0FC's poor image, and by the
NAD's half-hearted commitment to African agriculture. Segregated
markets weakened it further:
It is ironic that with thousands of potential consumers
among their own people on the Rand and in other large
45. KTZ Box 6, File N1/15/4, "Chiefs and Headmen Meetings,
T h a b i n a "
46. KtZ Box 6; File N1/5/4: '"Chiefs and Headmen Meetings,
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centres, the LBFC should be forced into competition with
European farmers. ...Urban natives, if they had the
chance, could consume all the fruit and vegetables
preduced by rural Natives. but there tire, not neirly
CMUIJIJII UrtL l vi) mtii IUJIO Lu ni-il'.u Lh I u »oa •-, I b I a . (' ' )
Despite these difficulties, improvements were made. By 1952, the
LBFC could market three-fifths of its produce; the remaining two-
fifths were used in the locations. While transport problems per-
sisted, a local canning factory at Politsi offered to buy up un-
marketable produce, unless whites objected.
Slightly improved marketing and absorption of produce did not
spell immediate prosperity for every member of the LBFC. While
most Farmers' Associations improved the total net income for win-
ter and summer harvests between 19*9 and 1952, Maroathola's
declined sharply from L1595.15.1O in 1949/50 to L360.13.11 in
1951/2. Tomato production in 1952 was less than a third of the
1949 crop: 22,055 lbs as opposed to 70,270. General fruit and
vegetable production was halved (13,510 lbs to 6,8081bs). Average
income appeared to rise, but this was due to the decline in the
number of producers on the location's 30 mcrgen of irrigated land
from 38 (1949) to 16 (1952).
Mamathola's • decline was attributed to its struggle against
removal. The tide of NAD opinion was turning against it. Agricul-
ture Officer Pienaar, while favouring the LBFC with his
patronage, reported adversely on Mamathola Location. He affirmed
the NAD's thirty year old image of the location as "oorbewoon, en
corbtwei", and overploughed. Once again, he alluded to the i r-
refutable disaster of its hillside position which exacerbated the
effects of this maltreatment. The location's dryness, and
reliance on small mountain streams, seemed to demand an irriga-
tion scheme. But, although in the early fifties, NAD's technical
staff increasingly saw the wisdom of irrigation for congested
areas, they also judged the solution too inflanmable. As a result
they ini tiated very few such schemes in native areas.(*a )
State intervention - or the lack of it - was not entirely to
blame for Hamthola's decline. The location had a long history of
internal dissension which was aggravated by the NAO's minimal in-
volvement in the L8FC as a whole. It refused to station a per-
manent agricultural demonstrator in Mamathola. Mamathola's
farmers resented this deepiy. For, in supporting an organisation
in which leading members of the chief 1y dynasty were not
prominent, the NAD was creating a pewer vacuum that Thomas Rakoma
Th^bina"
47. Ibid: 7.12.1949, The Star "Nctive Co-operative Draws
Dividends From Land No Longer Dying".
prominent, the NAD was creating a power vacuum that Thomas Rakoma
all too readily detected and filled. It is hard to determine when
the Rakoma clan had become a source of conflict. They were
prominent citizens of Mamathola: Rev. Hoses ran the Mabeleke
Church and School; Thomas was a well-known farmer; and Nimrod
Rakoma was a' trader in the location.(49)
Thomas wrote to the NC in November 1943 to say that there were
certain bodies - in the location who opposed any kind of improve-
ment in Mamathola,,and that Chief Vuma supported them. The bodies
were the Farmers' Association, the Post Office Committee and the
School Committee. This paDer does not explore the disputes in the
two latter committees. It must be pointed out,, though, that in
1957, when the Removal controversy escalated, the removal of the
Post Office and the two schools were hotly contested.(50 )
The most important phrase that Rakoma used showed a perhaps inad-
vertant sense of historic memory: "I wish the Commissioner to
make note of this .... disputes [outlined aboveH for future
reference". Rakona's letter shows that he made a habit of inform-
ing the NC on matters in Mamathola. He took a conspiratorial view
of events, and believed many people were ganging up on him. ver-
bal objections to Rakoma were first made in 1947, just after the
LBFC was founded. Josiah Makwela insinuated to the Agricultural
Officer that Rakoma was, perhaps too eagerly, doing the state's
work. "He goes about giving hint as we are still short of a
Demonstrator". By mid-1948, Makwela complained more directly,
this time to the NC Tzaneen, that Rakoma would:
...l.leave} his own work for any notice from the offi-
cials, to the farmers. He then starts from his home for
.Craighead to go and inform the farmers about the Notice.
On his return he goes about in the Mamahlola Location
d o i n g t h e s a m e . ( * ' ) , • • • • i •
Rakoma's tendency; to do the state's work became far more sinister
in tne subsequent decade. He was openly called an informer by
many of those who refused to move from the location. Yet his role
as "go-between" predated the removal and the L8CF. As early as
1943, he was telling tales to the NC, as he put it, "for future
reference". The embryonic disputes he reported became, fifteen
4S. NAD Report, 1950-1, p.29 '
49. KTZ Bnx 3: File N2/4/3/11, "Trading Sites Sedan: Saul Maepa
and Nimrod Rakoma, Mamatho'a's Location", 5.7.43-8.12.50.
50. KTZ Box 5: File N2/3/3/8O), "Church and School Site
Mubeleke: Mamathola's Location", 1.11.43, "Thomas Rako:na, Coun-
cillor to NC, Tzaneen"..
51. Ibid:- 29.10.1947, J.S. Makwela for Mamathola Farmers' As-
sociation (MFA) to Agricultural Officer; 15.5.1948, J.S, Makwela
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sion among the Hamathola by mis-reporting th° Chief's words on
several occasions. The Rakomavclan was quick to accept the offer
of the farm Metz, in mid-1957. This act incensed the Chief, who
swore under oath, that:
...the Rakomas, who are not members of the tribe, al-
though they resided in Mamathola Location, had decided
to move en 3 June 1957,... I knew that the Rakomas had . .
bsen having secret meetings wi th the HC, Tzaneen.(s!)
The fact that the State's Counsel included Rakoma's affidavit,
which denounced the Chief and his Councillors in their evidence
suggests that the state placed great valuo on his information
about Mamathola. The growi ng enmi ty between the Rakomas and the
supporters of Solomon Letsoalo illustrates the wa/s in which
residual ethnic di fference could be rev i vi fi ed and used to ex-
plain current political conflict. The restructuring of the rural
areas under apartheid brought many s immer ing conf1icts to the
bo 11 .
Some cone 1 us ions -
 :
While the actual c i rucumstances of the removal are the subject of
another paper, it is worth noting that the official reasons given
for the removal related to the same issues that had bothered
farmers and administrators for decades.
By mid-May 1956, whi te farmers in Letaba were growi ng sti11 more
restive. The Chairman of the Letaba District Farmers' Union's Na-
tive Affai rs Commi ttee could not understand why the Mamathola
Removal to Fertilis was being delayed. His Union felt "...erg
ontsteld oor die aanhoudende benadeling van dio waterb^onne van
die Litsetelle-rivier 'sic§ en die grond erosie wat steeds erger
word."(s 3 )
Potential advantage to white farmers was but one of the NAD's
considerations. The department had other, more recondite reasons,
for removing the cemmunity. In some ways, ths reasons themselves
remained theoretical, and ran aground on the contradictions of
HAO policy. It. seems that the more officials tried to remake the
rural ureas of SA in the image of apartheid, the more difficult
the task became. Simultaneously, the new philosophy of ad-
ministration translated itself into a new discourse for managing
for MFA to NC, Tzaneen.
52. MMB, "M. and S. Letsoalo versus the Union Government", First
Applicant's Replying Affidavit, para.5a,e.
53. NTS 8/423(25), (7.5.1956, "Brig. J.P. Ccetsee, Voorsitter
Naturellesake lOmitee. Letabs. Distrikboerounie to SNA".
Trans: "...deeply worried about the continuing destruction of the
water sources of the Letsitele River r.nd the soil =rosion which
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agricultural matters. This new language was a scientifici one,
capable of articulating (and legitimising) the department's tech-
nical plans'for rural development. The scheme as a whole bore the
title "AutogenousDevelopment".(s* ) :
•j*
The term and the scheme were vehicles of the NAD's new attitude
to "native" administration. Underlying "autogenous development"
was a reversal: of. previous NAO views of the historical and
political destiny of black South Africans. In broad terms, the UP
had advocated rural segregation, but lacked the inclination or
the ability to enforce it systematically., Its legal mechanisms
were, for the most part, held together by loopholes. In respect
of farming, ' its administrators tended to choose partial rather
than radical solutions: the NAD in the 1940s preferred the
limited intervention of reclamation and conservation to the dras-
tic invasion:of removal and resettlement.(5S)
The National Party changed all that. The NAD found reclamation
and conservation measures inadequate within three years of 1948:
Reclamation work has expanded considerably... *but§...
the progress .is too slow and one realises how inadequate
the rate of reclamation is when compared with the
destruction in these areas.(38)
Senior NAO officials soon came to regard their predecessors, as
well as certain local officials, as "soft" on the "Bantu". The
Native Trust had done everything for the "Bantu", who could now
do nothing for "himself". The new NAD told blacks that they were
now "on their own" in respect of agricultural aid, .and must
develop "on their own lines."(iJ) To this end, the department
proposed streamlining the bureaucracy of autogenous development
into four spheres. < It would lay the foundations of development
in the Bantu Areas while at the same time "extending the :work
...'of§ ...the Trust". Urban locations would be established on a
regional basis, and influx control employed to maintain popula-
is ever-worsening." :,' •
54. NAD Report 1953/4, pp.5-6. ;;' I
55. The exception to this broad statement is the Makoba Removal
of 1944, also in terms of Section 5(1){b) of the Native Ad-
ministration Act of 1927. The reasons for the removal, from the
Mount Currie district closely resembled those given for the
Hamathola Removal. Eiselen called for the files on Makoba in 1958
when he and Verwoerd were deciding how to deal with the
Mamathola. (NTS783: 159/335 "Mamathola Verskuiwing: File of
Secretary, Kaapstad".
56. NAD Report, 1951/2 p.35
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tion quotas in town:and countryside. The Department would divert
Bantu labour to the most promising labour markets in .order .to
promote the welfare and development of the whole country. To sus-
tain 'these poiicies and ensure black participation in them, the
NAD would integrate.education into broader community development.
Moreover - and thiswas the "break" with UP policy - black people
would be given responsibility for this development in order -to
replace the Bantu "... feeling of frustration in the past with a
sense of fulfilment."
This system was legally enacted 'under the Bantu Authorities Act
of 1951, which created a new administrative attitude towards "the
Bantu". The new attitude took into account their "racial
characteristics" and was not based on a "European conception of
soci al organisation". The new NAD also took from anthropology a
systematic and purposeful "explanation" of Bantu past and
present.
In establishing the Bantu Authorities the aim is ao to
extend the traditional Bantu system, that functioned ef-
fectively within the framework of primitive Bantu
economy and,culture, that it would also be effective un-
".der the new economic and cultural conditions under which
the Bantu live today.(S8)
Thus, the ma'jor project, Bantu Authorities, and the minor, the
Mamathola Removal, had similar trajectories: if not renovating
the Bantu past, then at least, re 1egating them to an impoverished
version of it. The parlous condi t ion of the reserve areas gravely
threatened to contradict '".he almost pastoral aims of Bantu
Authorities. Unless the Bantu co-operated with the MAD and con-
served the soil, Eiselen warned, it would be "too late". Time was
running out 'and, if they did not co-operate, the Bantu would
realise their own sorry destiny, rather than his department's
felicitous plan for them. The path to the latter led away from
"malicious agi tators" and "obsolete and primitive" farming
methods. They could not continue to expect soil conservation to
be "a purely professional service performed by European offi-
cials." In sum, Eiselen hoped that the political restructuring of
the countryside would solve its economic problems. Conservation
would become the concern of each Bantu Authority, and "linked up
with the traditional tribal system of government ... as soon as
authorities have been constituted under the BAA".(S9) The most
important government scheme for achieving this "link" was Better-
ment.
Implicit in all this talk of "Bantu Authorities" was a power
57. NAD Report, 1953/4 p.5-6.
58. NAD Report, 1950/1, p.5
struggle over the: control of chiefly office. Many chiefs had long
been in an ambiguous relationship with the NAD. The Native Af-
fairs Act of 1920; had begun their gradual transformation into
j-salaried government officials. The authority of "chiefly
councils" had beep replaced .by the government-dominated Local
Councils. At the ..same time, chiefs were striving to retain
authority and'credibi1ity within their communities. This struggle
was often bound up with changing gender relations in the
countryside. Increasing migrancy among men was creating rural
communities of women, elderly men and children. At their
Quarterly Meetings with NAD officials, the Letaba Chiefs
repeatedly demanded that the department exert greater control
over women. Passes for women was the cry on many chiefly lips in
the early fifties. . (8°) .
Betterment created both an intellectual and a practical framework
for agricultural renewal. The farming innovations proposed were
cast in the new scientific language that involved codifying the
land for specific uses as well as effecting actual .improvements.
Agricultural officials were kept busy demarcating arable lands,
terracing hillsides and proclaiming rehabilitation camps on some
of the dried and gullied farm, in some cases, the state super-
vised the improvement of water resources. Str1ps alonq rivnr
h.inka wor'o grassed; training banks for dams were built.
Duiwelskloof district alone acquired eleven stock dams by the
voluntary labour of "Natives themselves", using Trust equipment.
In that area, 149 miles of river beds were beaconed off for con-
servation.
Betterment allowed the state to create new futures for black com-
munities and discard their eld histories. Throughout, the Letaba
District, the NAD strove to remove and then "better" people whom
they decided"Were hot'really farming! In 1955, Toerien, the NAD's
Expert on Bantu Agriculture, was ordered to plan a betterment
scheme for the Mamathola.(6') There could be no removal without
betterment, especially on the Fertilis and Haffenden Heights
group of farms. Toerien submitted the plan reluctantly. He had
for years been aware of the worsening problems in Mamathola, ':but
was not convinced that the Fartilis farms offered any solution to
them. Yet he had to submerge his doubts in administrative
procedure: "...die saak \hetj nou so ver gevorder dat met die
goedkeuring van hierdie verslag, die werklike verskuiwing aan-
gepak kan word."(BJ) •
59. NAD Report 1950/1, pp.5-6.
60. See Quarterly Meetings, 21.12.1949 and 21.12.1950
61. The term "Bantu" is interleaved with the term "Native1' in
many NAD files at this time.
62. NTS 8/423(25): 10.8.1855, M. Toerien, Hoofvakkundigneampte,
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This report underlines the inadequacy of the land and the NAD's
land policy. Toerien minced no words when he said that the farms
had very limited dry and irrigated lands, which could not be ex-
tended.' Betterment's main aim was to relieve pressure on the land
by creating ample rural space for farmers within a ' single
settlement; Ferti1 is did not have enough land to accommodate such
a plan. Toerien unenthusiastically anticipated much competition
among farmers for access to the restricted farming lands. Most
families, farmers and non-farmers would inevitably end up in the
area intended for resident!al purposes alone. In short, farming
on an "economic basis", the watchword of Betterment, was impos-
sible. The scheme i tse1f would not weed out the farmers from tha
"pseudo-agriculturalists" the department so deplored; only the
passage of time would "skakel die non-boere uit".(83)
The Mamathola decided that they did not want to go., to Fertilis.
Solomon Letsoalo, speaking for the Mamathcla, opted for a Better-
ment scheme in Mamthola Location itself. The circumstances were
not, however, of his own choosing. The power of deciding what was
to become of Mamathola and its people lay in official hands. The
choice of policy was made at ministerial level on the advice of
NCs and Agrinulturn 1 Staff.
Ultimately, the threat of removal engaged the entire community in
a struggle for the location's reproduction. Education, the power
of chiefs and the powerlessness of women were key areas of con-
flict. The Mamathola Removal was a test case for many aspects of
NAD planning. Reclamation, conservation and culling schemes had
all bsen partial interventions reauiring partial planning.
Removal implied a very different initiative. If the community had
gone voluntarily, it would have vindicated the new, sterner ap-
proach to Bantu Administration in general, and "autogenous
development" in particular. But the Mamathola's resistance was so
strong that i t prompted, i nstead, a reconsideration wi thin the
department. It also provoked some debate among the white public
and much resentment among the black public about the prospects of
betterment.
On 20 September 195C, the CNC, Pietersb'Jrg warned Dr. Eis9len
that-he might have to reconsider the removal:
Mamathola x Resistance building up :< Satisfied none will
Pietersburg to Hoofnaturellekomisaris, P.burg. "Kommentaar i.v.m.
die Beplanning van die Ferti1isgroep". Trans: "...the case *has§
now proceded- so far that with the approval of this report, the
actual removal can be undertaken."
63. NTS 8/423(25): 10.8.1355, M. Toerien, Hoofvakkundiqneampta,
Pietersburg to Hoofnaturellekomisarisr P.burg. "Kommsntaar i.v.m.
die Seplanning van die Ferti1isgroep"
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come forward voluntary removal x Chief aaandoning post x -
Enumeration . improvements commenced :t Violence not
threatened but no co-operation x Suspending further ac-
tion pending instructions. (B * )
Eiselen forwarded the'-cabs 1 to Verwoerd. The fact that the
ter of Native Affairs was so involved in planning the details of
the removal suggests that- he realised how mucn depended on it.
Verwoerd outlined his plan to Eiselen, who sent it on to the CNC,
Northern Areas for forwarding to E.V. Liefeldt, the NC
Duiwelskloof. Liefeldt was a career administ-ator who had been
the NAD's major mediator with chiefs in Letaba. In late September
1956, the Minister requested that he and Toer:en constitute an ad.
hoc committee to-prepare him for-his 5 Octcser meeting with the
Mamathoia. Verwoerd was clearly as influenced by Toerien's 1955
unfavourable memorandum on1 Ferti1 is, as the CNC had been in May
of that year.(es >. , ; - -. - .. . - ..
64. NTS NA 6/423/(25), 20.9.1956 CNC, Pietersburg to SNA,
Pretoria • •: • . , .;, •;
65. NTS 8/423(25): 28.5.1956, p.S. Toerien, Agricultural Exten-
sion Officer to CNC, pietersburg; 29.5.1956, CNC, Pietersburg to " '•'
SNA, saying, on the basis of the Toerien Repcrt that he could not
support the removal, as it would mean resettlement on an unecomic
basis. "..ek verseker is daarvan dat, met tshoorlike beplannin, !
enveselnywerheid, ons die Mamathola mesnse in hulee eie lokasi
kan vestig en terselftetyd nog die gron end ^aterbronne bewaar en
beskerm." He added that he was only proceedirg with the Removal
because the Minister had insisted. In September that year, the
reluctant CNC had to warn the Mamathola if their impending
removal. The Mamathola sent a delegation to -neet him and ask for
6 months grace before~the removal.' The delegation came "from t h a t 5
part of the tribe that the NAD's "official version" designated
"minority", for example, Solomon Letsoalo anc Samuel Makweia. It
n I :io I nc ludoJ Thunma Rakoma and 3au I MIIIUJE J { o I aowhei o ^po I \*ni
Maepa, a location trader). They gave the CNC the impression that
they would not go to Haffenden, but were net unwilling to leave
Mamathola. At the time, the CNC had to issca certain threats to
them on b«half of the'NAD: - ,
1) That they must first go to Haffenden (Far-Llis group) and, if
they really didn't like it, they could opt tc move again.
2) That they would not be allowed to settle on white lands as
tenants.
3) That the Minister might be persuaded to crant an extension of
6 months if the tribe moved on their own. Tr= NAD would only pay
compensation for houses and transport to haads of families who
would go to Haffenden Heights to be bettered. Compensation would
only be paid after the removal. All these promises would only
come into effect if the tribe moved before 26 September 1956.
Moreover, the NAD's decision to allot plots en a first come first
\
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The Minister ordered the suspension of plans for moving the
Mamathola to Fertilis. Instead, he asked Liefeldt and Toerien to
investigate the viability of settling the community on the Trust
•farms Metz and Enable, near Leydsdorp. Verwoerd gave detailed in-
structions on the scale of farming he wanted to see established
there. He favoured a combi nation;. of ci trus and mixed fruit
farmers, some on irrigated plots. Given the limited water
resources,, the Minister wanted to be quite sure that .the minumum
of "lead out" [uitlel] canals would irrigate the land. Only 300
of the 400 families would be allowed to farm; the others must
live in the village to be constructed near the borders of farms
Turkey and Enable. The new village must be clearly separated from
Chief Sekororo's existing one and his influence. This last order
directly contradicted one of the NAD's official reasons for the
removal: to redraw the map on historical lines by reuniting the
Banareng with their former cognates, the Bakone of Sekororo.(8fl)
The Mamathola Removal was carried out in mid-1958, almost exactly
as Vsrwoerd had planned it. The legal case in which the Chief,
Halisela Letsoalo and his councillor Solomon sued the Union
.Government to return the Mamathola to their location achieved
nothing, the state had devoured the history of the Mamathola and
served them up a new and tasteless future.
served basis ('n lokmiddel om 'n vroe verskuiwing asn te moedig")
heightened the tension among Hamathola's residents as economic
needs and moral choices were forced into conflict.
66. See Van Warmelo, "The Ba Letswalo or Banarene", p.7
